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This research study was intended to determine how the US Government publicly 
responds to democratizing movements in non-democratic strategic partner states and non-
democratic adversarial states in light of its longstanding grand strategic goal of promoting 
democracy.  Specifically, this study addressed how the U.S. Department of State 
responded to the events of the Arab Spring through purposive sampling of archived press 
releases from the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs for a period of measurement of 
December 1, 2010 through December 31, 2011.  All 147 press releases within the period 
of measurement were subjected to multivariate analysis through summative qualitative 
content analysis, including a (quantitative) frequency count of key terms to determine 
language usage and a (qualitative) contextual and content analysis of language evolution 
as well as theme development.  The final conclusion of this study was that the US 
Government maintained pre-existing security relations with strategic security partners 
while publicly calling for liberalization via the transitional paradigm within those partner 
states.  The US Government supported democratization in adversarial states according to 
this research; however, state-sanctioned violence is an intervening variable within this 
research that strongly correlates with adversarial states.  It is plausible an adversarial state 
that does not engage in systematic state-sanctioned violence against protestors may not be 
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The concepts of freedom and democracy are integral parts of the identity of the 
United States (US).  Though ideology may divide the policymakers of the US, certain 
principles remain consistent between their platforms.  One consistency is the shared 
stance on the role of the US Government (USG) regarding the international promotion of 
democratic values – it is sufficiently important to be featured in multiple National 
Security Strategies (NSS) spanning three presidential administrations, all of which link 
democratic nations and the diffusion of democratic values to US national security.1  
While each presidential administration outwardly shared the desire to promote 
democracy, it is unclear how the agenda of promoting democratic values fared when it 
conflicted with other national security interests. 
President Bush’s Rhetoric 
 
President George Bush’s 2006 NSS provided tacit acknowledgment that 
compromise would be necessary to meet the varied and sometimes competing national 
security interests.2  During the Global War on Terror, President Bush actively advocated 
for democracy in Muslim nations as a means to improve overall social, economic, and 
political conditions within the Muslim world at a time when the U.S. was viewed 
critically by many Muslims for his administration’s counterterrorism strategies.3  The 
Bush administration’s willingness to compromise its identified democratization mission 
 
1 A National Security Strategy for a Global Age. December 2000. Page 1. | The National Security Strategy 
of the United States of America. September 2002. Page ii.| The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America. March 2006. Page 1. | National Security Strategy. May 2010. Page 5, 37-39. 
2 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. March 2006. Page 11. 
3 Nancy J. Davis and  Robert V. Robinson, “Freedom on the March? Bush's Democracy Doctrine for the 
Muslim World,” Contexts 6, no. 2 (Spring 2007): pp. 22-24. 
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in favor of strategic security policy undermined the importance of democratic reform.  
This contradictory policy stance was most clearly observed in states that were both 
governmentally authoritarian and a US security partner in the broader global 
counterterrorism mission; Egypt under Hosni Mubarak is identifiable as one such non-
democratic security partner that actively violated the fundamental rights of its citizenry 
and meddled in its domestic elections, yet only received “mild rebukes” from the US 
Department of State for those violations and was still granted significant USG financial 
aid by virtue of its security relationship with the US and its prominent role in Arab World 
politics.4 
President Obama’s Rhetoric  
 
President Barack Obama’s May 2010 NSS also recognized the need to prioritize 
among the various agendas in order to support the broader US national security.5  The 
2010 NSS stated support for the promotion of democratic values and for peaceful 
democratic movements while embracing a less assertive rhetoric than the earlier Bush 
administration NSS documents regarding the promotion vs. imposition of democratic 
values.6  Related to the Middle East, the 2010 NSS specifically identified several US 
interests related to Arab states; the first listed interest is the ongoing development of 
security ties to “Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries – partnerships that enable out militaries and defense systems to work 
together more efficiently.”7  Middle East security interests are referenced again in the 
 
4 Davis and Robinson, “Freedom on the March?,” pp. 23. 
5 National Security Strategy. May 2010. Page 9-10. 
6 National Security Strategy. May 2010. Page 5, 37-39. 
7 National Security Strategy. May 2010. Page 45. 
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NSS through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative 
with GCC countries for mutual security interests.8  The 2010 NSS also identified 
protection of individual and collective rights, freedoms, and needs linked to the political, 
social, and economic spheres of activity; support for civil society and human rights 
activists; and the promotion of governmental reform as strategic interests in the region.9   
The fact that security is listed before and after other fundamental regional issues, 
such as promoting individual freedoms or democracy in a region that is long associated 
with autocratic rule, is to be expected given American concerns within the region and 
may be an indicator of an unstated prioritization of interests.  The administration’s aim to 
develop stronger security ties with Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia linked the US 
regional security strategy to non-democratic nations.  Freedom House, a US-based non-
government organization that studies human rights, democracy and freedoms in nations 
around the world, assessed in 2010 that all three of those states were neither free nor 
electoral democracies.10  These security ties with non-democratic states and the 
administration’s support for democracy promotion continue Bush’s earlier contradictory 
policy stance on democratization, an approach the 2010 NSS categorized as “principled 
engagement.”11 
The Arab Spring 
 
 It is this juxtaposed position that is of interest to this study.  Beginning in 
December 2010, there was a wave of popular uprisings seeking government reform and 
 
8 National Security Strategy. May 2010. Page 45. 
9 National Security Strategy. May 2010. Page 45. 
10 Arch Puddington (ed), Freedom in the World 2010: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil 
Liberties, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, (New York; 2010): pp. 207, 209, 342-343, 565-566. 
11 National Security Strategy. May 2010. Page 38. 
4 
 
democratization throughout the Middle East and North Africa.  These uprisings, known 
as the ‘Arab Spring,’ provide an unique opportunity to examine how the USG publicly 
engaged with democratizing movements across a number of different states with varying 
diplomatic relationships with the US.  Do the wave of popular protests advocating for 
democratic reforms inspire a change in US policy or does the strategic security stance 
remain unfettered as the dominant determining factor for US foreign policy?  Does an 
ideal trump a pragmatic practice?  Using the May 2010 NSS as a guide on the Obama 
administration’s grand strategy, a subset of public press releases issued by the USG will 
be analyzed to determine how closely the administration’s rhetoric adheres to its 




Within the context of this study, the primary areas of interest are the studies of 
Grand Strategy, Prioritization of Interests, and Democratization. 
Grand Strategy 
 
While it is relatively unburdened with operational level details or specific policy 
proposals, a NSS provides insights into the focus of a presidential administration and it 
outlines the grand strategy for near-, mid-, and long-term policy efforts for that 
administration, ceteris paribus.  The Obama administration’s identification of promoting 
democracy as one policy goal in the 2010 NSS indicates that it forms a part of the 
administration’s grand strategy.12 
 
12 National Security Strategy. May 2010. Page 37. 
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Per Murdock and Kallmyer (2011), US policymakers should focus on the creation 
of an overarching grand strategy which incorporates the nation’s prioritized goals and the 
manner in which these goals are to be met.13  This prioritization of national goals is 
necessary amid a period of declining resources and relative influence.14  Resource 
limitations obligate policymakers to choose between various agendas, leading to 
outcomes that may compromise ideals or lower priority national objectives, but are still 
consistent with the long-term high priority national goals.  The 2010 NSS, while it did list 
policy goals, failed to formally prioritize its various agendas, creating uncertainty 
regarding the extent to which the administration will pursue its declared goals.  As such, 
a purpose of this study is to attempt to induce how the goal of promoting democracy and 
human rights is prioritized during a period of social conflict in a strategically significant 
region of the world. 
 The principle of grand strategy itself is not without its opponents; forming an 
overarching grand strategy has been challenged as an impractical exercise in the modern 
era due to the confluence of domestic partisan politics and populist movements, the loss 
of a shared US national narrative and identity, and the non-polarized world system 
controlled by state and non-state actors.15  In place of grand strategy, Drezner Krebs, and 
Schweller (2020), propose decentralization and incrementalism, where power is localized 
to the regional USG actors or granted to the pertinent USG experts rather than enshrined 
at the White House and responses to world events are addressed in an ad hoc, graduated 
 
13 Clark Murdock and Kevin Kallmyer, “Applied Grand Strategy: Making Tough Choices in an Era of 
Limits and Constraint” Orbis, (Fall 2011): pp. 542. 
14 Murdock and Kallmyer, “Applied Grand Strategy,” pp. 544. 
15 Daniel Drezner, et al., “The End of Grand Strategy: American Must Think Small,” Foreign Affairs 99, 
no. 3 (May/June 2020): pp. 108. 
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manner commensurate with the matters in question.16  While Drezner et al., are correct 
regarding the increasing difficulty of crafting a grand strategy and regarding the failure to 
prioritize within the strategies, they ignore the purpose of having a grand strategy as a 
guide to policy over the course of an administration.  Moreover, they assume that today’s 
society is a unique moment of political conflict, which may be a result of an 
oversimplification of historical conflict and hindsight bias.  They are also correct in their 
assessment that decentralized and incremental responses to emergent crises may allow for 
a relatively more coherent response in situ, but it would likely lead to disjointed or 
inconsistent responses in a larger context and may encourage isolationistic tendencies. 
 Deep engagement has been the primary grand strategy employed by the US in the 
post-WWII era.  As an approach, it requires robust international ties in the economic, 
political, and security sectors.17  In exchange for these ties, a Great Power is able to exert 
significant influence across global commons, create international standards and 
institutions, gain access to new markets, and become a model for developing states.  Per 
Christopher Layne, a significant shortcoming of deep engagement is the expenses of 
maintaining global networks which is further exacerbated by limited or decreasing 
resources.18  Barry Posen argues that deep engagement, or the liberal hegemon model, 
encourages smaller powers to counterbalance or bandwagon against the Great Power.19   
The 2010 NSS acknowledges overreach on the part of the previous administration 
through its repudiation of “imposing” US values on other countries.  Engagement with 
 
16 Drezner, et al., “The End of Grand Strategy,” pp. 117. 
17 Stephen Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William Wohlforth, “Lean Forward,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 1 
(January/February 2013): pp. 130-142. 
18 Brooks et al, “Lean Forward,” pp. 130-142. 
19 Brooks et al, “Lean Forward,” pp. 130-142. 
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other states and peoples is actively advocated as a means of strengthening the US and the 
international order upon which the US is reliant; isolationism is rejected as contrary to 
US interests.20 
 Emma Ashford (2018) calls for a more restrained form of grand strategy, 
specifically in the form of less ambitious goals and through offshore balancing as was 
embraced in the Middle East during the Cold War.21  Offshore balancing is a method 
Ashford assesses would reduce the US defense expenditures in the region and end the 
contest between security demands and democracy promotion goals by reducing the need 
to be militarily positioned in the region and using more diplomacy.22  It is unclear 
whether Ashford accepts democratization promotion as a legitimate goal for US foreign 
policy at the strategic level; however, within the framework of this study, promotion of 
democracy is most clearly observed from the diplomatic frame of reference.  Offshore 
balancing could be a theoretical construct through which the 2010 NSS Middle East 
policies are enacted if the administration truly does assume a more ‘hands-off’ approach 
and is unwilling to continue deep engagement. 
National Values and National Interests 
 
Prioritization of interests is key to a grand strategy.  Two of the major lines of 
thought within the scholarly literature regarding the role of values promotion as a part of 
national interests are realism and liberal internationalism. Realism, derivative of the 
traditional realist worldview, considers democracy promotion to be counterproductive to 
 
20 National Security Strategy. May 2010. Page 1-5, 11-12. 
21 Emma Ashford, “Unbalanced: Rethinking America’s Commitment to the Middle East,” Strategic Studies 
Quarterly 12, no. 1 (Spring 2018): pp. 128-129. 
22 Ashford, “Unbalanced,” pp. 132, 135. 
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maintaining national power, placing primacy on traditional security and economic 
interests and allowing no consideration of the domestic politics of foreign states.23  
Liberal internationalism embraces democracy promotion as a way to construct an 
international system that is more receptive to American machinations through the spread 
of new democratic states.24  Notably, values promotion is not the dominant feature of this 
particular approach, with tradition security and economic interests maintaining significant 
sway over foreign policy.  It is expected that the USG approach in this study will comply 
with liberal internationalism, although it is uncertain how direct values promotion will be 
for partner and adversarial states. 
 Research related to how national values and core national interests relate in 
foreign policy is inconclusive due to the absence of an adequate means to prioritize 
between competing frames of reference (i.e. a moralistic approach or a realistic 
approach).  Interests and values can be pursued in unison, but conflict between these 
competing principles is likely, which may lead to incoherent policy or an action which 
fails to meet either the national interest or national value.25  Depending on how national 
values are framed, different results may emerge.  The advancement of universal values 
results in a cosmopolitan outlook that reinforces fundamental rights while acknowledging 
the role of unique cultural influences on the development of democracy.26  Such an 
approach is intended to be inclusive in nature.  A more exclusionary approach to values 
promotion as a national interest is formed when the promoted values are fundamentally 
 
23 John Owen, “Democracy, Realistically,” The National Interest 83 (Spring 2006): pp. 35. 
24 Nicolas Bouchet, “The Democracy Tradition in US Foreign Policy and the Obama Presidency,” 
International Affairs 89, no. 1 (January 2013): pp. 36. 
25 Jonathan Gilmore, “The Uncertain Merger of Values and Interests in UK Foreign Policy,” International 
Affairs 90, no. 3 (May 2014): pp. 542. 
26 Gilmore, “The Uncertain Merger of Values and Interests in UK Foreign Policy,” pp. 544. 
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nationalistic, unique to a specific country or culture.27  These values are not easily 
transferred to other nations, regardless of the effort expended by the promoting state. 
External Actors in Democratization 
 
Democratization can be defined in a variety of ways depending on the model 
employed.  The minimalist model places primacy upon free and competitive elections.28  
Electoralism fallacy is the key failing of this model, as identified by Karl (1990), where 
the act of holding competitive elections is the principle characteristic by which a nation is 
deemed democratic.29  The minimalist approach is overly broad since competitive 
elections can be held in autocratic states as a token measure of reform or as a means of 
legitimizing the government.   
An alternative approach is the evolutionary model.  Dahl (1971) and Eckstein 
(1998) both advocate for an evolutionary model of democratization where governmental 
reform, specifically rule of law and protection/promotion of civil society, is instituted 
over an extended period of time to prevent the premature abortion of the democratic 
experiment in developing states.30  Similar to the evolutionary model, the transition 
paradigm, formed by O’Donell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, is a process in which a non-
democratic state forms the political structure, establishes a civil society, and then 
enfranchises the people.31  Scholars have rejected the transition paradigm as a viable 
 
27 Gilmore, “The Uncertain Merger of Values and Interests in UK Foreign Policy,” pp. 549. | Bouchet, “The 
Democracy Tradition in US Foreign Policy and the Obama Presidency,” pp. 37. 
28 Richard Rose and Doh Chull Shin, Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third Wave 
Democracies, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde (Glasgow; 1999): pp. 6. 
29 Rose and Shin, Democratization Backwards, pp. 6. 
30 Rose and Shin, Democratization Backwards, pp. 5. 
31 Michael Shulz, “The Role of Hamas in Building Palestinian Democracy in the Midst of Violence,” in 
The Democratization Project: Opportunities and Challenges, Ashok Swain, Ramses Amer, and Joakim 
Öjendal (eds.). Barbara Budrich Publishers (2007): pp. 115. 
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means of democratization due to the consistent pattern of failure to transition to 
democracy among non-democratic states.32 
Both the transition paradigm and the evolutionary model suffer from the same 
faults in that the democratizing states do not need to commit to democracy, and the 
state’s elites are able to consolidate power during the “transitional” period.  These states 
may allow select liberalization initiatives to be implemented over time, but liberalization 
does not necessarily lead to the same structural changes as full democratization.  It is 
potentially at the convergence of the concepts like the minimalist model, the evolutionary 
model, and the transition paradigm that non-democratic US strategic allies are able to 
indefinitely delay democratization efforts in favor of selective liberalization of their 
societies and further consolidate power.  This study is intended to identify how the USG 
promotes democracy with public statements, specifically whether the USG encouraged 
piecemeal liberalization or full democratization. 
Whitehead (2007) and Swain, Amer, and Öjendal (2009) assert that with each 
case of democratization, it becomes less certain that democratization is a process which 
can be artificially engineered or accurately predicated due to the variability in every 
case.33  Research regarding the promotion of democratization is similarly multifaceted 
due to the expanded roles for supranational entities, non-government organizations, and 
private interests in addition to the traditional role played by the state actor.  Whitehead 
 
32 Laurel Miller, Jeffrey Martini, F. Steven Larrabee, Angel Rabasa, Stephanie Pezard, Julie Taylor, and 
Tewodaj Mengistu, “Democratization and Democracy Promotion: Trends, Theories, and Practices,” in 
Democratization in the Arab World: Prospects and Lessons from Around the Globe,” RAND Corporation 
(2012): pp. 16. 
33 Laurence Whitehead, “Twenty-First Century Democratizations: Experience Versus Scholarship,” in 
Democratization: The State of the Art, 2nd ed, Dirk Berg-Schlosser (ed.). Barbara Budrich Publishers 
(2007): pp. 111-112. | Ashok Swain, Ramses Amer, and Joakim Öjendal, The Democratization Project: 
Opportunities and Challenges, Anthem Press (UK: 2009): pp. 2. 
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(2007) details that external powers are able to directly influence the democratization 
process from actions that span from conditionality of support (e.g. financial support) to 
full control (i.e. imposed democratization), while simultaneously acknowledging the 
ability of external powers to indirectly influence non-democratic states by virtue of their 
citizens’ desire to attend US and European universities as well as through other forms of 
soft power influence.34  Mansfield and Snyder assess that external powers lack a 
significant impact on the domestic democratization of foreign states.35  Research 
indicates that while aggregate foreign aid does not encourage democratization, “targeted 
democratization assistance” does provide some support to democratic transitions; 
however, states that receive significant US military aid have been assessed to be less 
effected by targeted democratization assistance.36  Durac and Cavatorta (2009) assessed 
that promotion of democracy within non-democratic security partner states through 
economic liberalization policies reinforces the authoritarian government due to its role in 
controlling the economy and establishing patronage networks.37  Ironically, this form of 
liberalization encourages the people to lend greater support to the authoritarian 
government in order to benefit economically, therefore citizens’ financial well-being 
comes at the expense of expanded political freedoms. 
Keck and Sikkink (1998) provide a social movement theory perspective via the 
boomerang effect, which posits that a social movement organization (SMO) is able to 
 
34 Whitehead, “Twenty-First Century Democratizations,” pp. 123. 
35 Lars-Erik Cederman, Simon Hug, and Andreas Wenger, “Democratization and War in Political Science,” 
in War and Democratization: Legality, Legitimacy, and Effectiveness, Wolfgang Merkel and Sonja Grimm 
(eds.), Routledge (London, 2009): pp. 55. 
36 Miller et al, “Democratization and Democracy Promotion” pp. 28-29. 
37 Vincent Durac and Francesco Cavatorta, “Strengthening Authoritarian Rule through Democracy 
Promotion? Examining the Paradox of the US and EU Security Strategies: The Case of Bin Ali’s Tunisia,” 
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 36, no. 1 (April 2009): pp. 12, 14. 
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leverage external pressure from states and non-state entities to meet the SMO’s objectives 
within a host state.38  Seeking support outside of the SMO’s host state allows the 
organization to reframe the traditional political opportunity structure for redressing 
grievances by incorporating international and transnational actors.39  Reframing 
democratization under the umbrella of social movement theory may present a different 
theoretical framework for democratization, but it is uncertain how effective social 
mobilization could be in autocratic states reluctant to implement governmental reform.  
This is a possible area for theoretical expansion, especially due to the persistent 
irregularities within the study of democracy and the routine development of new models 
for each variation of democratization or failure to transition to democracy. 
Hypothesis 
 
The proposed hypothesis for this research study is the following: the collocation 
of significant US security interests and a democratizing movement in a non-democratic 
strategic partner state will result in a lessened USG focus on promoting democracy in 
favor of pre-established security interests.  This can be assessed by evaluating how the 
USG publicly responded to democratizing movements throughout the Middle East and 
North Africa during the Arab Spring.  The anticipated conclusion is that the USG will 
favor a strategy supporting the overall national security interests (securitization) in 
partner states, while encouraging democratization in adversarial states. 
 
38 John Guidry, Michael Kennedy and Mayer Zald, Globalizations and Social Movements, The University 
of Michigan Press (Ann Arbor, 2000): pp. 1. 





Summative qualitative content analysis is the principal tool of this research study, 
a method outlined by Hsieh and Shannon (2005) combined with the multivariate content 
analysis concept of Robert Mitchell (1967).40    Summative qualitative content analysis 
combines a quantitative frequency count with a qualitative latent content analysis, 
providing the study a focus on language usage and development.  The purposively 
sampled dataset was reviewed through a frequency count using a list of key terms 
developed through a priori and inductive approaches to determine language use in the 
dataset.  The frequency count was facilitated through the PDF word find function.  All 
matches to the key terms and associated derivative terms were recorded in tables for 
further analysis.  These tables were organized by term, time (month and year), and press 
release.  After every text was quantitatively reviewed, the texts were comparatively 
analyzed based on their frequency counts, relevance to the Arab Spring protests and 
country of focus to determine correlations for language use in partner states and in 
adversarial states.  Subsequently, latent content analysis of the dataset was conducted to 
identify how language use changed within the dataset, both between adversarial and 
partner states and within each state’s associated press releases, as well as develop themes.  
Relevant findings were documented in country-specific memos.   
Use of the frequency count and the latent content analysis is intended to provide 
within-method triangulation, thus increasing the internal validity of the study’s findings 
by identifying convergence through the two approaches with primacy assigned to the 
 
40 Hsiu-Fang Hsieh and Sarah Shannon, “Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis,” Qualitative 
Health Research 15, no. 9 (December 2005): pp. 1283-1285. | Robert Mitchell, “The Use of Content 
Analysis for Explanatory Studies,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 31, no. 2 (Summer 1967): pp. 240-241. 
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qualitative findings.41   Expansion of the contextual analysis, to include the entire 
individual press release, is intended to overcome the general lack of depth to analysis in 
standard examples of summative qualitative content analysis.42 
The presence of key terms in the dataset will not determine the accuracy of the 
hypothesis, but it may reveal a statistical trend within the USG messaging.  Assessing the 
textual trends and identifying how those trends compare with similar circumstances in 
different nations with different security relations with the US should allow judgment over 
the hypothesis.  Collocation of indicators for securitization and democratization is 
expected.  When this occurs, judgement will be based on the contextual emphasis of the 
message.   
The hypothesis suggests that the USG press releases will reflect broad support for 
securitization of nations closely aligned with American interests and support for 
democratization of nations with adversarial relations with the US.  Indicators of support 
for democratic reform or liberalization in nations that are aligned with the US are very 
likely to be present, but will likely not be as overt as for nations that are adversarial to 
American interests.  This hypothesis will be accepted as valid if this scenario is realized 
through the analysis of the dataset.  Should the releases propose securitization for 
adversarial nations or overt democratization for partner states, the hypothesis will be 
rejected. 
The Department of State is the most prominent ‘voice’ of the USG in matters 
related to international affairs, thus it is the most likely governmental body to provide 
 
41 Steven Miller and Marcel Fredricks, “Can There Be ‘Rules’ For Qualitative Inquiry,” Journal of Thought 
31, no. 2 (Summer 1996): pp. 62-66. | Todd Jick, “Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: 
Triangulation in Action,” Administrative Science Quarterly 24, no. 4 (December 1979): pp. 606-608. 
42 Hsieh and Shannon, “Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis,” pp. 1285. 
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relevant statements for the convergence of U.S. foreign policy and ongoing foreign 
affairs.  A purposively sampled dataset was selected from the archived press releases of 
the US Department of State’s Bureau of Near Asian Affairs.  All press releases issued 
between December 1, 2010 through December 31, 2011 were collected for review, 
providing approximately 54 weeks of material after the start of the Arab Spring protests.  
Using this curated set of USG records is intended to create an uniformity to the dataset, 
remove any overt selection bias on the part of the researcher, and preserve any biases 
held by the USG. 
Limitations 
 
There are limitations of this method and dataset that must be acknowledged.  
Qualitative content analysis is a subjective method, therefore generalizability of 
conclusions will likely be minimal, particularly with the study focusing on closely related 
case studies.  The dataset is public press releases archived on a single Department of 
State website, thus it does not contain every statement issued by the State Department, 
much less the USG, relevant to the Arab Spring events.  Private and diplomatic 
discussions are not available in public releases nor are any classified government policy 
deliberations, which reduces the overall value of using public statements to judge USG 
responses to individual events. 
Data43 
The full tables for the text review of the dataset have been condensed into three 
separate tables (see below for Tables 1-3).  This condensed format provides an overview 
 
43 For a full listing of the Department of State releases spanning 01 December 2010 – 31 December 2011, 
see the Appendix. 
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of the primary subject and press release number, the total dataset, and the specific portion 
of the dataset of interest to this study – press releases directly relevant to the Arab Spring 
movement.  Relevance to the Arab Spring movement was determined by examining each 
press release for references to protests and/or government transition in response to 
protests.  If the press release did not contain any reference to either protests or 
governmental transitions, the press release was deemed irrelevant to the Arab Spring 



















Table 1: Countries of Reference and Press Release Number 
 
Dec 2010 Jan 2011 Feb 2011 Mar 2011 Apr 2011 May 2011 Jun 2011 Jul 2011 Aug 2011 Sep 2011 Oct 2011 Nov 2011 Dec 2011
Egypt 1 1 1; 2; 3; 4; 7 7; 12 15 1 3
Jordan 3 16 7
Palestine/Israel 5; 6 1 5 6; 7; 8 9
3; 4; 5; 8; 
13
2; 4; 8; 20 3; 4; 14 6
Iran 2; 6 12 7 6 16 5; 6 1; 14 10 4; 10
Iraq 3 5; 10 3; 4 3 2
1; 2; 14; 
17; 18; 19
8 5 7 1; 8 1; 3; 9
Tunisia 4; 5 1 18 4
Kuwait 9
Libya 13; 14; 15 5 7
3; 11; 12; 
15
2; 15; 17 11; 13 2; 5; 8 2
Bahrain 3
KSA 2 2
Yemen 4 9 19 13
Morocco 5 6
Syria 1; 3; 4 6; 9; 11; 16





















Regional - Kuwait, 
Iraq
2; 6
Regional - Qatar, 
Sudan
1
Regional - FTO 4
Regional - Egypt, 
Tunisia
8 7
Regional - Kuwait, 
Tunisia, Morocco
4
Regional - Oman, 
Yemen
13
Regional - OIC 10
Regional - Egypt, 
Israel
9; 14




Regional - Syria, 
Iran
6
Regional - Iraq, 
Turkey
9
Regional - Jordan, 
KSA, UAE
11




Regional - MENA 7
N/A - Eid 1; 3





















Dec-10 6 54 0 0 N/A
Jan-11 6 39 2 22 4, 5
Feb-11 16 198 11 109
1-4, 6-7, 11, 
13-16
Mar-11 7 92 1 37 5
Apr-11 3 24 0 0 N/A
May-11 8 75 4 52 1, 3, 7-8
Jun-11 19 158 7 72
2, 3, 9, 11-
13, 15
Jul-11 9 82 2 31 1, 4
Aug-11 17 84 5 42 11-12, 15-17
Sep-11 22 221 10 166
6-7, 9-13, 15, 
18, 22
Oct-11 14 49 7 35
1-2, 5-6, 8, 
11-12
Nov-11 9 46 2 29 3, 7
Dec-11 11 21 0 0 N/A
Totals 147 1143 51 595
19 
 
Table 3: Key Terms and Tallies 




Over the course of the measured period, a total of 147 Press Releases were 
assessed; of these, only 51 of the press releases were of direct relevance to the Arab 
Spring events.  Within the press releases identified as related to the Arab Spring, the State 
Department focused on Tunisia (four releases), Egypt (nine releases), Bahrain (two 













Abuse 14 (1) Harass 1 (1) Resistance 3 (2)
Activist 8 (6) Humanitarian 15 (11) Restraint 5 (3)
Advocate 5 (4) Inclusive 4 (4) Revolution 3 (2)
Anti-American 2 (0) Infringement 1 (0) Rights 48 (23)
Arab Spring 2 (2) Interlocute 4 (2) Rule 10 (5)
Aspiration 8 (6) Intimidate 3 (3) Safe 10 (7)
Assembly 4 (4) Justice/Judicial 23 (6) Sanctions 24 (4)
Assure 4 (2) Law 34 (11) Security 61 (23)
Attack 36 (14) Leaders 42 (15) Solidarity 2 (1)
Brutal 6 (6) Legitimate 6 (2) Stability 13 (5)
Civil Society 19 (15) Movement 2 (0) Stand 8 (7)
Collaborate 9 (5) Negotiate 26 (4) Strategy 17 (3)
Condemn 11 (3) Opportunity 47 (21) Support 87 (51)
Corrupt 14 (6) Opposition 10 (8) Suspend 4 (4)
Crackdown 4 (2) Partner 70 (24) Terror 38 (14)
Criminal 13 (4) Peace 36 (17) Torture 2 (1)
Democracy 25 (23) Persecution 2 (1) Transition 40 (33)
Demonstrate 14 (12) Promote 16 (5) Tyranny/Tyrant 1 (1)
Detain/Arrest/Jail 16 (11) Protest 11 (5) Unrest 2 (2)
Dialogue 20 (11) Rebel 2 (1) Uprising 3 (3)
Elections 9 (9) Reconciliate 2 (2) Victim 7 (0)
Evacuate 15 (15) Reform 18 (12) Violate 6 (4)
Expression 9 (9) Regime 31(24) Violence 25 (17)
Freedom 13 (11) Rejection 1 (1) Welfare 2 (2)
Grievance 2 (2) Repress/Oppress 8 (6) Youth 25 (11)
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release), and assorted regional messages which were not specific to a single nation and/or 
addressed multiple nations (eight releases).44  Individual key terms with the highest tallies 
within Arab Spring-related Press Releases include Support (51 tallies), Transition (33 
tallies), Partner (24 tallies), Regime (24 tallies), Democracy (23 tallies), Security (23 
tallies), and Rights (23 tallies).  
Tunisia and Egypt (partner states), and Libya and Syria (adversarial states) will be 
addressed in the quantitative comparative analysis and in the qualitative latent content 
analysis due to their larger data pools, creating four case studies.  Key terms that strongly 
correlated with strategic partner states include: partner, strategy, transition, collaborate, 
stabilize, negotiate, and dialogue.  These terms may indicate potential support for 
securitization of relations, a tentative assessment that will be further assessed in the 
qualitative review.  Similarly, key terms that strongly correlated with adversarial states 
and may indicate potential support of democratization include: violate, regime, tyrant, 
brutal, crackdown, sanction, intimidate, and persecute. 
Tunisia, addressed individually in four Arab Spring-related releases, received a 
total of 108 tallied terms.  Among these, the top-five highest tallied terms were Support 
(17 tallies), Partner (eight tallies), Transition (eight tallies), Opportunity (six tallies), and 
Democracy (six tallies).  Among the key terms identified as indicators for securitization 
and democratization, Tunisian-related releases received 24 tallies for terms linked to 
securitization and two tallies for terms linked to democratization. 
 
44 Note:  This tally of country-specific releases is only capturing the press releases assessed as relevant to 
the Arab Spring.  Various other releases were included in the total dataset which addressed the named 
nations, but those releases had no direct relevance to the events of the Arab Spring. 
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Egypt, addressed individually in nine releases, received a total of 89 tallied codes.  
Among these, the top five highest tallied terms were Violence (10 tallies), Demonstrate 
(nine tallies), Peace (nine tallies), Evacuate (nine tallies), and Transition (six tallies).  
Among the key terms identified as indicators for securitization and democratization, 
Egyptian-related releases received 18 total tallies for terms linked to securitization and 
one total tally for terms linked to democratization. 
Libya, addressed individually in 15 Arab Spring-related releases, received a total 
of 122 tallied codes. Among these, the top five highest tallied terms were Support (14 
tallies), Humanitarian (11 tallies), Regime (10 tallies), Transition (10 tallies), and 
Security (nine tallies).  Among the key terms identified as indicators for securitization 
and democratization, Libyan-related releases received 15 total tallies for terms linked to 
securitization and 15 total tallies for terms linked to democratization. 
Syria, addressed individually in 11 Arab Spring-related releases, received a total 
of 112 tallied codes. Among these, the top five highest tallied terms were Regime (12 
tallies), Attack (10 tallies), Rights (eight tallies), Activist (six tallies), and Peace (six 
tallies).  Among the key terms identified as indicators for securitization and 
democratization, Syrian-related releases received five total tallies for terms linked to 
securitization and 27 total tallies for terms linked to democratization. 
Table 4: Tentative Quantitative Assessment 
Country Securitization Tally Democratization Tally Tentative Assessment 
Egypt 15 1 Securitization 
Libya 15 15 Undetermined 
Syria 5 27 Democratization 




With this frequency count, the hypothesis is tentatively validated by three of the 
four case studies.  In the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, the tallies for the securitization key 
terms outnumber the tallies of democratization key terms while in the cases of Syria, the 
inverse is true; this is in line with the strategic positioning of the US.  The Libya case 
study, resolving to a tie, requires contextual analysis for a determination. 
Qualitative Assessment 
 
 Under latent content analysis, all press releases related to Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, 
and Libya will be reviewed in order to generate sufficient contextual reference to how 
language use changes within the dataset.  Pertinent themes will be developed between 
and within case studies. 
Egypt 
 
 16 total press releases relate to Egypt, although not all are relevant to the Arab 
Spring.  The USG refers to reform throughout these press releases; however, none of the 
proposed reforms directly challenged the legitimacy of the government.   
Social reform and economic reform are featured topics in the two Egypt-related 
press releases that precede the Arab Spring protests.  The press release indirectly 
advocates for social reform through the work of an Egyptian woman who was an alumna 
of the International Visitor Leadership Program of the US Department of State.45  
Through the woman, the USG is promoting the development of foreign and transnational 
civil society, one of the identified mechanisms by which an external party can promote 
democratization and one of the goals identified within the 2010 NSS.46  The woman’s 
 
45 Appendix, Press Release 1, December 2010. 
46 National Security Strategy. May 2010. Page 12. 
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work itself may enable critiques of the Egyptian social status quo yet her challenges on 
social issues only indirectly challenge the government to institute any liberalization 
policy.  Notably, the USG does not call for the Egyptian state to create social reform of 
any kind within the press release.  The lack of an overt call to action may indicate a USG 
desire for change to develop organically in the state.  
The other pre-Arab Spring press release addresses economic reform through the 
Global Entrepreneurship Program, within which it is established that economic reform 
has already taken place.47  More importantly, the press release acknowledges the active 
role of the Egyptian government in reforming the economy.48  As assessed by Durac and 
Cavatorta (2009), non-democratic states can co-opt economic reforms, limiting the 
efficacy of economic liberalization as a pathway to democratization.  Per the 2010 NSS, 
use of international investment serves to further integrate Egypt into the global economy 
and build a stronger Egyptian government, while simultaneously gaining greater US 
access to the Egyptian market.49  In the press release, there are no indicators of overt calls 
for reform or democratization.  Use of words such as “partner” to describe the Egyptian 
government, as well as terms such as “opportunity” and “invest” indicate that the US 
supported a securitized framework with liberalization policies prior to the outbreak of the 
Arab Spring protests in Egypt. 
 The first two post-protest press releases for Egypt, released on 1-2 February 2011, 
reveal a focus on US interests, specifically the US citizens located within Egypt and the 
evacuation efforts during ongoing demonstrations to ensure the safety of those citizens.50  
 
47 Appendix, Press Release 1, January 2011. Paragraphs 2-3, 5. 
48 Appendix, Press Release 1, January 2011. Paragraph 3-4. 
49 National Security Strategy. May 2010. Page 24, 26-27, 31-34. 
50 Appendix, Press Release 1, February 2011. | Appendix, Press Release 2, February 2011. 
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This early press release makes no effort to characterize the nature of the demonstrations 
and acknowledges a safety concern that demonstrators could target US citizens which 
indicates the USG may have been uncertain of the purpose of the demonstrations or the 
nature of the protestors.  By acknowledging that concern regarding the demonstrations, 
the press release frames protestors as a potential threat while remaining silent on the role 
of the government in creating the circumstances that lead to the demonstrations or any 
role that the government may have in escalating the tensions with the protestors.  A 
theme that emerges from the depiction of threat that differentiates securitization and 
democratization is that threats to US interests are presumed to emanate from the 
demonstrations or clashes with demonstrations in partner states while the threats to US 
interests are openly acknowledged to emanate from the governments/proponents in 
adversarial states. 
Also released on 2 February 2011, the third post-protest press release addresses an 
episode of violence during otherwise peaceful protests.51  This missive acknowledges the 
restraint demonstrated by the Egyptian Armed Forces during the protests, calls for 
accountability for violent actors, encourages dialogue between the government and the 
opposition, and expresses support for a democratic government in line with the 
“aspirations of the Egyptian people.”52  Importantly, the press release does not place 
responsibility for the violence on the Egyptian security apparatus, although it was 
believed that some of the violence was precipitated by plainclothes government security 
forces operating within the pro-government demonstrators during confrontations with 
 
51 Appendix, Press Release 3, February 2011. 
52 Appendix, Press Release 3, February 2011. Paragraphs 1-2. 
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anti-government demonstrators.53  In essence, this press release respects the role of the 
security apparatus as an institution, calling for accountability only against the parties 
“responsible for violent acts” as opposed to denouncing the entire security apparatus for 
any overreach during the public protests.54  Such a stance would indicate support for 
securitization of relations; however, the missive also called for a transition to a “more 
open, pluralistic, and democratic government,” which would indicate support for 
democratization.55  The final sentence of the missive is key to determining the stance of 
the USG, “Lastly, the Secretary noted that the United States remains committed to 
working in partnership with Egypt in helping to achieve the aspiration of the Egyptian 
people.”56  As a stand-alone statement, this would indicate a willingness to support the 
Egyptian government (“…partnership with Egypt in…”) as opposed to directly 
supporting the Egyptian people; it allows the US Government to publicly maintain its 
pledged support for democratization while concurrently protecting its relationship with an 
important regional security partner in the incumbent Egyptian government.  Bolstering 
this assessment is the fact that the press release details a phone call between Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton and Egyptian Vice President Omar Soliman.57  Secretary Clinton 
did not issue an open letter remark directed at the Egyptian government with her concerns 
nor did she communicate with the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the 
official concerns between the two states; while highly circumspect, this form of contact 
 
53 “Egypt Uprising of 2011,” Encyclopaedia Britannica.  
54 Appendix, Press Release 3, February 2011. Paragraph 1. 
55 Appendix, Press Release 3, February 2011, Paragraph 2. 
56 Appendix, Press Release 3, February 2011. Paragraph 2. 
57 Appendix, Press Release 3, February 2011. Paragraph 2. 
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could be indicative of the close relations between the two states as the USG sidestepped 
the professional diplomats in favor of direct contact. 
Another press released on 2 February 2011, addressing the same violence as 
Secretary Clinton did during her phone call, condemned violence against peaceful 
protestors and journalists, stating that the violence represents a threat to the goals of the 
protestors and calling for restraint.58  This press release is not directly stating support for 
securitization or democratization, nor does it attempt to assign responsibility for the 
violence.  Notably, the missive also makes no reference to democracy nor does it attempt 
to identify the goals of the Egyptian people, rendering this a statement of support for the 
right to peacefully protest.  Support for the right to peaceably protest can be assessed as 
support for liberalization, and such support is in line with the language of the 2010 NSS 
regarding support to peaceful democratic movements. 
A statement released on 22 February 2011 indicates support for the Egyptian 
protest movement by describing a process of direct engagement with a news organization 
popular with the demographic population that supported the protest movement and the 
US Secretary of State.59  Demonstrators from Tahrir Square developed some of the 
questions for the Secretary.60  There is no overt language within the missive that supports 
democratization or securitization, but there is language that accentuated the desire of the 
USG to engage with civil society and Egyptian youths as well as statements supporting 
rights of expression and association.61  By placing an emphasis on engaging civil society, 
supporting fundamental freedoms, and targeting the protesting demographic, support for 
 
58 Appendix, Press Release 4, February 2011. Paragraphs 1-2. 
59 Appendix, Press Release 7, February 2011. Paragraphs 1-2, 5-6. 
60 Appendix, Press Release 7, February 2011. Paragraph 4. 
61 Appendix, Press Release 7, February 2011. Paragraph 6. 
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liberalization is latent.  The context of this press release bolsters the theoretical 
underpinnings of the boomerang effect of Keck and Sikkink; however, the engagement 
between the social movement participants and the USG lacks the traditionally defined 
social movement organization and there is only indication of USG ideational support for 
the social movement as opposed to more tangible forms of support that could be used to 
effect change within Egypt.  This would reinforce the Mansfield and Snyder assessment 
regarding external powers’ lack of influence over democratization. 
Similarly, a press release released on 25 May 2011 supports the liberalization of 
Egypt and Tunisia.”62  Repeated usage of terms such as “democratic transition,” 
“opportunity,” “reform,” “partner,” “investment,” “stability,” and “global markets” and 
references to various multilateral and international organizations (G8, IMF, World Bank, 
African Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development) indicates that the USG seeks liberalization in Egypt and Tunisia and hopes 
to draw Egypt and Tunisia deeper into the global economy and the liberal international 
order.  Nevertheless, this release is not directed toward Egypt but towards other members 
of the G8, and is aspirational in nature, detailing how democratic transitions in Egypt and 
Tunisia could be aided by external partners through financial policy.63  Overt dialogue of 
this nature is not directed towards Egypt or Tunisia, reducing the value of the USG 
messaging regarding the promotion of democratization. 
One of the press releases addresses the status of the Bright Star combined military 
exercise coined . The US Department of State response indicated the mutual decision to 
 
62 Appendix, Press Release 8, May 2011. Paragraph 4. 
63 Appendix, Press Release 8, May 2011. Paragraph 1. 
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postpone the 2011 exercise was a “part of our routine bilateral conversations.”64  This 
decision was due to “transition events” that were occurring in Egypt, although the 
Department of State spokesperson stated that the parties agreed to plan the 2013 iteration 
of the exercise in June 2012.65  Word choice in this response (“postponed” vs 
“cancelled”) sends an indirect message to Egypt that it is not being abandoned and that 
security-related affairs will return to normal in the future.  Acknowledging the 
transitional nature of the Egyptian state yet reaffirming the role of the security-relations 
reinforces USG support for securitization, particularly as the decision to postpone the 
exercise was stated to be mutually determined and the USG did not publicly establish any 
conditionality on the exercise’s future status. 
 Signaling more support for securitization, Secretary Clinton referred to the 
Egyptian-Israeli peace as a “cornerstone to regional stability.”66  The Secretary provided 
her condolences to the “loved ones of an Egyptian soldier” who had recently died of 
injuries, likely incurred during a terrorist attack that led to Israeli military forces firing 
upon Egyptian soldiers.67  The significance of this release is that it establishes an 
extranational role for the Egyptian government in maintaining regional stability and 
reveals that the USG sought to form a link to the Egyptian military by expressing 
condolences for a soldier’s death.  While the act of expressing condolences for the death 
of an individual is usually insignificant in international relations, it can be interpreted as a 
display of support for the Egyptian military and its mission by a senior USG official in 
 
64 Appendix, Press Release 12, August 2011. Paragraph 1-2. 
65 Appendix, Press Release 12, August 2011. Paragraph 2. 
66 Appendix, Press Release 9, September 2011. Paragraph 1. 
67 Appendix, Press Release 9, September 2011. Paragraph 1. 
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this case, particularly due to the overlap in strategic security interests involving Israel and 
regional peace. 
In another release, the spokesperson for the Department of State said, “Egypt’s 
transitional government, led by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), has 
committed itself to carrying out a transition to the free and fair election of a civilian-led 
government.”68  While this is a simple statement of fact, it offers no assessment of the 
military government’s efforts to liberalize society.  The spokesperson also indicated that 
the USG has “encouraged” SCAF to implement civilian legal processes rather than using 
military courts and to repeal an emergency law.69  There is overt support for democratic 
principles such as rule of law, human rights, and free and fair elections, but there is also a 
deference to SCAF as it relates to implementing these changes under the transitional 
government.  The USG is “encouraging” SCAF to undertake these efforts, but the 
messaging does not indicate conditionality of support or any attempt to intervene within 
the domestic politics of Egypt beyond said encouragement.  Such a stance would appear 
to support liberalization and securitization rather than full democratization. 
The final press release related to Egypt during the period of measurement 
confirms a strong security relationship between the US and Egypt, announcing an 
impending gathering at the US Department of State for the Criminal Justice and Rule of 
Law Working Group, held under the auspices of the Global Counterterrorism Forum 
(GCTF) and cohosted by Egypt.70  As the release states, GCTF was established on 22 
September 2011, which places this development well after the violence that was 
 
68 Appendix, Press Release 15, September 2011. Paragraph 2. 
69 Appendix, Press Release 15, September 2011. Paragraph 2. 
70 Appendix, Press Release 3, November 2011. Paragraph 1. 
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perpetrated by Egyptian security forces during the protests, thereby affirms the 
commitment between the USG and the Egyptian government.71  The missive further 
claims that the intent is “to provide support for countries seeking to turn their backs on 
repressive approaches to counterterrorism and to encourage criminal justice authorities to 
adopt robust and human rights-compliant counterterrorism policies and practices that 
protect both the security and liberty of their citizens,” specifically identifying nations 
involved in the Arab Spring protests as target nation-states for this support.72  No mention 
is made of Egypt’s own counterterrorism policies and practices, nor is there any mention 
within this release of the Arab Spring protests within Egypt or the violent repression 
techniques used to control protests.  It cannot be determined with a significant degree of 
confidence why these key pieces of context were omitted in this media note; however, 
elevating Egypt to the role of co-host for the conference can be interpreted as a validation 
of the Egyptian government’s security apparatus, regardless of any differences in opinion 
or policy that there may be between the two states.  Moreover, placing Egyptian 
authorities in such a prominent position in an US-based event creates a new international 
frame of reference for Egyptian security officials as experts in counterterrorism-related 
rule of law, legitimizing their actions in the international realm despite any abuses within 
the domestic realm.  The note’s reference to security practices that “protect both the 
security and liberty of their citizens” can be interpreted as support for democratization; 
however, it would likely be more accurately interpreted as support for liberalization and 
the institution of rule of law.  Establishing a consolidated democracy would require 
 
71 Appendix, Press Release 3, November 2011. Paragraph 1. 
72 Appendix, Press Release 3, November 2011. Paragraphs 2-3. 
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liberalization, but illiberal democracies and non-democratic governments also embrace 
forms of liberalization as identified in the fallacy of the transition paradigm.  
 Overall, the language of the press releases related to Egypt indicates a strong 
preference for securitization over democratization.  USG messaging supports 
liberalization, but it is undermined by both the language used in those statements 
(encouraging reform while offering deference to the military) and outweighed by the 
larger volume of material addressing the security forces in a neutral or positive manner.  
The case of Egypt validates the working hypothesis.  While Egypt is non-democratic and 
has employed repressive techniques to subdue peaceful protests, it is a strategic security 
partner of the US in a geo-strategically significant region of the world. 
Tunisia 
 
Of the 147 Press Releases, 9 relate to Tunisia, although not all 9 are directly 
relevant to  the events of the Arab Spring.  Press releases will be addressed 
chronologically and based on relevance. 
The first press release regarding Arab Spring events in Tunisia was issued 23 
January 2011.  Principally addressing the democratic transition that the interim 
government was shepherding, the press release expresses support for the efforts to create 
a more inclusive society, holding free and fair elections, instituting rule of law, and 
engaging in political reform.73  This particular press release provides no context of the 
actual Arab Spring protests because a transitional government was already formed and 
efforts to democratize were already initiated organically.   
 
73 Appendix, Release 4, January 2011. Paragraph 1-2. 
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A joint statement by Secretary Clinton and the Tunisian Foreign Minister on 22 
September 2011 announced the US-Tunisia Joint Political and Economic Partnership, a 
bilateral agreement addressing shared interests.74  In addition to support for the 
democratization and state building processes, economic cooperation and liberalization, 
and educational cooperation, the USG and Tunisian government agreed to cooperate on 
security matters.75  To be specific, the agreement addressed security matters related to 
“training assistance, information-sharing, and work to counter extremist messaging,” as 
well as bolster Tunisia’s “defense capabilities.”76  Through this agreement, it is obvious 
that the USG is rendering financial aid in support of democratization efforts; however, 
the inclusion of defense aid confirms the willingness to securitize relations. 
Tunisia lacks the long-lasting strategic relationship with the USG that Egypt 
developed over years of security cooperation.  In spite of this, Tunisia is a nation that 
meets the standard for securitization of relations because of its self-directed 
democratization process and integration into the broader liberal international system 
through economic and educational cooperation with the US as well as its support to the 
Global War on Terror.  Tunisia does not represent a threat to the international order that 
would require isolation or direct intervention, thus it validates the working hypothesis as 
an example of securitization. 
Libya 
 
Of the 147 press releases, 20 relate to Libya, although not all 20 are directly 
relevant to the Arab Spring.  In them, there is a notable distinction between the language 
 
74 Appendix, Release 18, September 2011. Page 1, Paragraph 1, 3. 
75 Appendix, Release 18, September 2011. Pages 2-3. 
76 Appendix, Release 18, September 2011. Page 2. 
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of the releases concerning Muammar Gadhafi or his government and those concerning 
the Transitional National Council (TNC).  This distinction between the TNC and the 
Gadhafi-led government justifies the earlier quantitative findings. 
The releases addressing Gadhafi and his government place more attention on the 
humanitarian crisis created by the effort to retain power.  Extrajudicial action targeting 
noncombatants is observable from the first Libya-centric press release, which linked 
unauthorized journalists to terrorist organizations without any evidence or due process.77  
As a result, the press release contains a warning of danger to media personnel posed by 
the Libyan government and its supporters.  This is the inverse of the presentation of 
threats that was observed in the press release involving the early Egyptian 
demonstrations, creating a cleavage in how partner and adversarial states are addressed. 
 Press releases concerning the government of Libya changed the word choice from 
“government” to “regime” or “Gaddafi regime” after state-sanctioned violence against 
peaceful protestors was initiated.78  The word ‘regime,’ as a reference to government, 
carries an innately negative connotation in modern American English and associating a 
regime with a single person can be intended to underline the authoritarian nature or the 
personification of the referenced government.  The words ‘violence’ and ‘regime’ are 
frequently collocated within the press releases linked to Libya, Syria, and even Iran 
(which falls outside of the scope of this study). 
 For the press releases related to the Gadhafi government, there is a clear 
preference for the removal of Gadhafi and a direct call for the democratization of Libya.79  
 
77 Appendix, Release 13, February 2011. 
78 Appendix, Release 5, March 2011. 
79 Appendix, Release 3, June 2011. Page 2. 
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There are no calls for specific pieces of reform (e.g. free and fair elections, rule of law, 
freedom of expression…) that could be used to placate external powers.  Under the 
condition of civil war, Gadhafi-era Libya meets the requirements for democratization 
under this study; unfortunately, this assessment cannot be generalized to adversarial 
states due to the impact of state-sanctioned violence on Libya during the period of 
measurement. 
 Libya is unique within this dataset due to the number of releases related to the 
Transitional National Council (TNC), an opposition body that formed in Libya during the 
civil conflict.  USG and international support is clearly stated in multiple releases.80  
Within the context of this study, the TNC emerged to assume a similar position as the 
transitional governments of Egypt and Tunisia, even though Libya was facing very 
different circumstances by virtue of the military conflict.  References to legitimacy, 
rights, and transition (of power) all indicate support for the greater integration of the TNC 
into the international order.81  Ties to the international order similarly situated both 
Tunisia and Egypt as states who fell under the securitization umbrella, but the TNC lacks 
the official government status due to the open conflict initiated by the Gadhafi-led 
government.  Regardless of official status, it is reasonable to conclude that the TNC is 
embraced as a securitized state in its role as a shadow government.   
Syria 
Of the 147 press releases, 15 relate to Syria, although not all 15 are directly 
relevant to the Arab Spring.  Press releases will be addressed chronologically and based 
on relevance. 
 
80 Appendix, Release 7, May 2011. | Release 3, June 2011. 
81 Appendix, Release 7, May 2011. | Release 11, June 2011. 
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The first press release relevant to Syria was issued on 5 July 2011.  Within that 
release, the language used clearly establishes that the Syrian government has engaged in 
unacceptable actions against peaceful protestors: specific examples of this are include 
“ongoing attacks against peaceful protestors,” “repression and harassment on peaceful 
protestors and opposition members,” “killing protestors,” and “intimidation and arrest 
campaign.”82  The release similarly establishes that there is limited trust in the statements 
of the government of Syria, especially since its actions and the actions of its security 
forces directly contradict its stated interest of engaging in “dialogue with the 
opposition.”83  Concluding the release is a call for the Syrian government to cease its 
current actions and allow a “genuine transition to democracy” occur, while the USG 
further states that the international community is in solidarity with the Syrian people.84  
Violations of international mores on the use of legitimate state violence leads to the 
ostracization of the Syrian government from the broader international community.  Due 
to the excessive actions of the Syrian security forces, this release features a direct call for 
democratization that requires no analysis to determine. 
A press release from 8 July 2011 invoked Syria’s status as a State Sponsor of 
Terrorism.85  While the content of the press release is irrelevant to this study, the 
reference to Syria as a State Sponsor of Terrorism reaffirms that the government of Syria 
operates in a manner that is ill-suited for the liberal international order.  Another release 
from 8 July 2011 brought forward the issue of Syrian embassy personnel engaging in 
 
82 Appendix, Release 1, July 2011. Paragraph 1. 
83 Appendix, Release 1, July 2011. Paragraph 1. 
84 Appendix, Release 1, July 2011. Paragraph 1. 
85 Appendix, Release 3, July 2011. Paragraph 1. 
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surveillance of peaceful protestors in the US.86  The press release directly emphasized the 
importance of individual freedoms and indirectly raised the issue of the violation of US 
national sovereignty.  As a result of the Syrian government’s actions within the US 
against lawful protest activities, it is assessed that this release indirectly supports 
democratization of Syria. 
A press release from 17 August 2011 provides an example of a change in word 
choice similar to Libya;  previously, press releases referred to the Syrian government or 
the government of Syria, but in this release the government of Syria is referenced as the 
“Assad regime.”87  Adjectives are also utilized in this release, transforming “aggression” 
to “brutal aggression.”88  While the change is relatively insignificant to its literal 
meaning, it is an overt display of increasing hostility towards the government of Syria 
and is intended to draw attention to how it continues to violate the rights of the Syrian 
people and the sensibilities of democratic states.  It is assessed that this release supports 
democratization. 
A 25 August 2011 statement iterates some of the same linguistic messaging 
techniques as the 17 August release through multiple references to the “regime” and 
repeated usage of adjectives such as “brutal.”89  Focus within this statement is on the poor 
treatment of human rights advocates and activists, and this statement features a “demand” 
for the cessation of a “campaign of terror” that includes “torture, illegal imprisonment, 
and murder.”90  The use of the word “demand” is more forceful than the language used in 
 
86 Appendix, Release 4, July 2011. Paragraph 1. 
87 Appendix, Release 11, August 2011. Paragraph 2. 
88 Appendix, Release 11, August 2011. Paragraph 2. 
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other statements which featured words such as “encourage” or “urge.”  “Demand” places 
a greater sense of urgency on the need for change or reform.   Moreover, reference to 
terror, torture, and murder continues a theme of tying the Syrian government to illegal 
and immoral actions that are not accepted in democratic societies.  Rhetorical techniques 
are continued in a 8 September press release where Syrian government messaging was 
described as “regime propaganda.”91   
 Additional press releases are available on Syria, but their review reinforces the 
identified evidence.  Press releases on the Syrian government reflect an increasingly 
hostile attitude towards the known abuses of the Syrian population and its disregard for 
international law and rule of law.  In accordance with the parameters of this study, the 
USG strongly supports democratization of Syria, but as with Gadhafi-era Libya, this 
assessment cannot be generalized due to the outsized impact of state-sanctioned violence 
observed during the period of measurement. 
Conclusion 
 
These findings show that the US Government’s promotion of democracy is 
inconsistent as it relates to the four states reviewed in this dataset.  Non-democratic state 
actors (e.g. Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya’s TNC) that initiate “transitional” governments are 
able to effectively posture as democratizing states with limited pushback from the USG 
press releases regarding ongoing practices.  Libya and Syria failed to engage in any 
productive dialogue with protestors and enacted repressive tactics to maintain 
 
91 Appendix, Release 6, September 2011. Paragraph 2. 
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government control, leading to overt USG calls for democratization.  This establishes 
congruence between the qualitative and quantitative reviews. 
Table 5: Final Assessment 
Country Assessment 
Egypt Securitization 
Libya (Gadhafi) Democratization 




Overall liberalization of non-democratic states is a goal, but security concerns are 
prioritized higher than ideal-based goals.  It cannot be determined to what length the US 
will go to ensure that reforms are instituted based on this study.  Adversarial states are 
not given the same latitude as partner states, although it is also uncertain how much state-
sanctioned violence influenced USG messaging.  In Libya, military force was employed 
to confront a Libyan government-directed military campaign against its own citizens, yet 
in Syria no such external force was used in spite of similarities with Libya.  In Egypt, 
platitudes were issued regarding structural reforms, but key security ties were maintained 
and reinforced in spite of the selective use of state-sanctioned violence against peaceful 
protestors. 
US grand strategy appears to maintain deep engagement while offering a liberal 
internationalist perspective operating through a cosmopolitan approach with regards to 
prioritization of democracy promotion under this research study.  The preferred 
democratization model for the USG is the transition paradigm/evolutionary model for 
partner states according to this study.  Rhetorically, the USG supported immediate 
democratization of adversarial states, but the data failed to identify how the USG sought 
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to create these changes – external imposition of democracy was not addressed and would 
be unsupported by the 2010 NSS.  Even in Libya, where the US supported military 
intervention, there was no external imposition of democracy; the Libyan TNC may 
provide the best example of how the USG would respond to an adversarial state 
democratizing.  Through the TNC, the USG supported the transitional paradigm; 
however, the Gadhafi-led government was not a participant to that process, so it is 
unclear if the transitional paradigm would apply to adversarial states or only to new 
political entities emerging in adversarial states.   
While this study finds that U.S. foreign policy remains multifaceted with 
competing priorities, it does not represent a departure from the orthodox conclusions 
within the existing body of literature on the subject.  US strategy retains a preference for 
security and stability in the face of otherwise destabilizing democratic forces in an effort 
to protect a status quo for traditional allies and/or partner states.  When considering 
adversarial nations, the U.S. strategy does not require maintenance of the national-level 
status quo so much as a preservation of the existing liberal international system, thus the 
U.S. advocates for democratic reforms in the hopes of improving the international status 
quo. 
Insomuch as the US may prefer to maintain the status quo of international 
relations, an intervening variable which very likely had a significant impact on this study 
is state-sanctioned violence.  While violence occurred at some level in each of the major 
states to undergo substantial Arab Spring protests, only Libya and Syria devolved into 
civil war during the period of measurement and only those states were determined to be 
subject to democratization in accordance to this study.  More research will be necessary 
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to determine the extent to which the application of state-sanctioned violence against 
civilians functions as a catalyst to calls for democratization within non-democratic states, 
especially if democratic states are permissive of limited violence in other situations (e.g. 
Egypt). 
A more in-depth analysis of official government records is required to gain a full 
understanding of the USG’s position on democratization at a general level, and the Arab 
Spring at a more granular level.  It may be valuable to conduct a comparative review 
between statements from the bureaucratic entities (e.g. the State Department) and the 
statements from senior-level elected officials and political appointees to determine if 
there are discrepancies in how democratization is framed, especially with non-democratic 
partner states.  Any discrepancies between the bureaucracy and the senior officials may 
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